By Our Defence Correspondent
Sea Tiger Leader Soosai personally gave the order for the three Black Sea Tigers to blow up their own boat off Delft island on Friday and commit suicide in full view of two Norwegian ceasefire monitors, despite the LTTE’s negotiators agreeing in Berlin that the arms on board their boat would be handed over to the Sri Lanka Navy and the Tiger cadres allowed to go free, according to sources in the North.

This act showed the LTTE’s utter contempt for the entire peace process and their refusal to change their culture of terror, directly contravening the collective decision taken in Berlin by LTTE Chief Negotiator Anton Balasingham, Secretary to the LTTE Delegation Adele Balasingham, Head of Political Wing S. P. Thamil Chelvam, and Special Commander for Batticaloa-Ampara ‘Colonel’ Karuna, together with Norwegian facilitators and the government delegation which was led by Ministers G. L. Peiris, Rauff Hakeem and Milinda Moragoda, and Secretary of the Peace Secretariat Bernard Goonetilleke.

Incredibly, all three sides, the LTTE, Norwegian government, and the government of Sri Lanka, then tried to cover up for the Tiger high command, by publicly declaring that the suicide was the result of a "gap in communication" between the LTTE commanders and the Sea Tiger boat that was carrying arms and ammunition.

This statement is completely false, since the last conversation the three cadres had over the radio was with Soosai, moments before setting fire to their boat and killing themselves. There is no denying the fact that Soosai knew of the decision in Berlin at the time of his conversation, since the LTTE headquarters in the Wanni had already received a detailed instruction from the LTTE negotiating team in Berlin over a satphone.

At the time of Soosai’s conversation, even the two monitors were aware of the Berlin decision, since they had been informed by SLMM Headquarters in Colombo. Officers on board the navy fast attack craft that had surrounded the vessel were also aware of the negotiated solution, since the government negotiating team had briefed Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe on the phone, and the PM had informed Navy Commander Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri, who had relayed the message to the north.

As the whole world knows, it is part of the Tigers’ culture that LTTE cadres on a mission never surrender to anyone, even in peacetime. This has been the case several times before, going back to the time in 1990 when 14 Sea Tigers killed themselves when the navy intercepted their boat off the Jaffna Peninsula, to the setting fire of the ship MV Ahat several years later in the Bay of Bengal with senior LTTE leader ‘Col.’ Kittu on board, to last April’s blowing up of an LTTE arms boat off Vakarai.

Soosai is known as one of the most draconian of LTTE leaders, and he has built the Sea Tigers into the formidable force that they are through sheer discipline. Once Soosai’s order was given, there was no way out for the three cadres. If they had not killed themselves, it is most likely that they would have been executed by the LTTE when they got back.

While the LTTE was thumbing their noses at the negotiations, it was responsible and fast thinking by officers of the Sri Lanka Navy on board the Dvora gunboats and at the Northern Headquarters, that saved the peace process from disaster, while preventing the LTTE from smuggling in the arms consignment across the Palk Strait.

While the navy is to be commended for its handling of the entire incident which lasted for almost 24 hours, the most significant decision was to quickly release another LTTE boat which had been towing the boat that contained arms and ammunition.

This boat had contained no less than 12 other cadres, 10 men and two women. Had they been kept at the scene, they too would probably have been ordered by Soosai to commit suicide. While few are shedding any tears over the deaths of three cadres, the loss of 15 cadres would have been a much more serious issue, and one wonders whether the peace process would have survived.

The drama began on Thursday afternoon, when two Dvora fast attack craft on patrol off the Jaffna islands spotted the two boats off Delft Island at 1:45 p.m. The boat being towed was in fact an Indian trawler that had been stolen by the LTTE, and its name changed to "Rajah."

The officers in charge of the Dvoras reported the sighting to the Navy’s Northern Headquarters in Kankesanthurai, and blocked the passage of the two boats by placing their Dvoras firmly in the way of the Tigers. They were under strict orders not to fire unless they were fired upon first, and not even a single warning shot was fired. Naval officers were unsure at this time as to who was on board, and were wondering whether there might be Indian fishermen on board.

Within minutes, the Northern Area Navy Commander Rear Admiral C. N. Thuduwewatte informed the office of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission in Jaffna, and asked that a monitor be sent to the scene. A small navy craft picked up the monitor, Pers Ander Skavik, and a female Tamil interpreter and ferried him to another Dvora, which took him to the scene. Skavik arrived at 3:30 p.m., less than two hours after the initial sighting. Navy officers asked him to search the vessels for contraband.

Skavik and the interpreter boarded the first vessel, and searched it, but found nothing, except that the boat was powered by two 200 horsepower engines, which in itself was a violation of the ceasefire, since the Sea Tigers are not allowed to use such high-powered engines. However, this was not a very serious issue and the navy then released this boat, which sailed off towards the mainland.

Skavik and the interpreter then boarded the second boat, along with several navy sailors. But immediately, the three cadres yelled that they would commit suicide if the navy searched the boat. The sailors were quickly withdrawn, and Skavik searched the boat but found nothing. The three cadres were in fact quite senior LTTE men, ‘Major’ Amban (who had lost a leg in action against the navy earlier and was wearing an artificial limb), ‘Captain’ Kuhan, and ‘Capt.’ Badumadevan.

However, navy officers observed that he had not been able to thoroughly search the boat, and asked him to conduct another search. However, Skavik told them that he could not do an extensive search by himself and said they would have to help him. At this point, the three cadres renewed their threat to commit suicide if the navy sailors came on board.

Navy officers then called the SLMM’s Jaffna office and asked for a second SLMM monitor to come and assist Skavik. By 5:30 p.m. the second monitor, Sven Loesnes, arrived at the scene on another Dvora.

But at this time, SLMM Headquarters in Colombo seemed to have second thoughts, and instructions came in to Skavik and Loesnes that they should not search the boat again.

By now, Vice Admiral Sandagiri had been briefed by Rear Admiral Thuduwewatte, and in turn had spoken to the Defence Minister, who made a call to the Prime Minister. The PM fired an urgent call to Minister Milinda Moragoda in Berlin, and told him to talk to the LTTE negotiators to resolve the matter.

Throughout Thursday night, the situation off Delft remained tense, and the two monitors spent the night on board the Sea Tiger trawler.

Early on Friday, the SLMM decided to conduct a second search, and quickly found a complete 23 millimetre heavy gun, which had been dismantled into three parts for transport. They also found two boxes of 23 mm ammunition, believed to carry several hundred shells, one AK47 assault rifle with ammunition, and three hand grenades.

At this point, the navy objected to the cadres continuing to talk to their superiors on the radio, and the SLMM took control of the radio set. All sides waited for the negotiators in Berlin to wake up, with Germany being four hours behind Sri Lanka time.

In Berlin, the first session of talks had been scheduled to be on human rights matters, but this was put aside to discuss the Delft situation. The LTTE negotiators were constantly talking to LTTE headquarters in the Wanni; the Ministers were talking to the PM in Colombo; and Norwegian Facilitator Erik Solheim was discussing matters with the Norwegian government and the head of the SLMM in Colombo General Trond Furuhovde.

Meanwhile, the SLMM put out a media release pronouncing that the carrying of arms and ammunition was a serious violation of the Ceasefire Agreement.

By 11:30 a.m. Sri Lanka time, the negotiators came to the decision that the guns and ammunition would be handed over to the SLMM which would give them to the navy, and the three cadres would be released. All sides informed their superiors, and the Defence Minister called Vice Admiral Sandagiri with the news.

On board the Dvoras, officers and sailors breathed a sigh of relief. All that remained was for the three cadres to receive an order from LTTE headquarters, and the matter would end, or so they assumed.

Shortly afterwards, LTTE Headquarters radioed the LTTE’s Jaffna office, which in turn called the SLMM office in Jaffna, asking that the three cadres be instructed to call LTTE Headquarters on the radio. The SLMM Jaffna office spoke to the Navy’s Northern Headquarters, which in turn signalled the Dvoras, which then passed the message on to the two SLMM men, who told the LTTE cadres.

The cadres made the call, watched by the SLMM monitors (the interpreter had gone back on board a Dvora), and Soosai gave the order of death.

The cadres then set fire to their boat, and Skavik and Loesnes leaped overboard. As the Norwegians were plucked out of the water by a Dvora, the LTTE boat blew up. The 23 mm ammunition exploded with quite a show.

The LTTE ordered black flags to be flown in Jaffna over the weekend, as signs of mourning for the three cadres.

Meanwhile, on the East coast, another hunt was going on. Indian intelligence reported that an LTTE arms ship was unloading arms into large boats off the coast, and the Sri Lanka Navy and Air Force scrambled to search the seas. On Thursday evening, a ship was sighted that was believed to be the LTTE vessel, and gunboats intercepted it, only to find that it was a container carrier bound for Colombo.

However, intelligence once again confirmed the presence of the LTTE ship, and the hunt continues.